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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MERVIN R. REID and ETHNA R. 
REID, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs 
MUTUAL OF OMAHA INSURANCE CO. 
and UNITED BENEFIT LIFE INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 17637 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for breach of a Lease Agreement and a 
Counterclaim for constructive eviction. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court sitting without jury rendered judgment 
in favor of plaintiffs and dismissed Defendants' Counterclaim. 
RELIEF ON AN APPEAL 
Respondents, Mervin and Ethna Reid, seek affirmation of 
the lower court's order granting judgment in favor of plaintiffs 
and dismissing Defendants' Counterclaim and remand to the 
District Court for an award of reasonable attorney's fees as 
provided for in the lease agreement. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about September 15, 1980 plaintiffs entered into a 
lease agreement with defendants. Plaintiffs occupied the top 
floor of the Reid Office Building and defendants, Mutual of 
Omaha and United Benefit Life Insurance Company (hereinafter 
referred to as f!Mutual of Omaha11) and Intermountain Marketing 
took possession of the bottom floor simultaneously (R. 431), 
Beginning in November of 1980, Mutual of Omaha, by and 
through its General Manager, Hector Diaz, began complaining of 
alleged problems encountered as tenants in the Reid Building (R. 
441), The alleged problems raised by defendants were concerns 
which are common in the rental of any building, noise from the 
adjacent tenant, improper maintenance of the common restrooms, 
improper use of the common areas by the adjacent tenant, parking 
problems, failure to properly remove ice and snow from the 
parking lot and sidewalks, Mr. Diaz complained to the Reids 
every time the restrooms were short on paper products or any 
time he perceived a problem (R. 643). 
Plaintiffs, Mervin and Ethna Reid, listened to the 
complaints of defendants and then worked to solve the alleged 
problems of Mr. Diaz (R. 445, 451, 455, 456, 461-463, 465, 466, 
770-776). On several occasions Mr. and Mrs. Reid met personally 
with Intermountain Marketing to attempt to alleviate any alleged 
problems created by them (R. 451, 456, 465, 473, 770-776, 763) 
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and even caused their attorney to send a letter to Intermountain 
Marketing (R. 472). In each instance, Intermountain Marketing 
agreed to stop or limit practices that were being complained of 
by Mr. Diaz (R. 770-776). Intermountain Marketing even agreed 
to stop the complained of noise emanating from their office 
until after office hours (R. 607, 537). 
Aside from the improper removal of ice and snow and the 
improper maintenance of the restrooms which Mr. Diaz admits was 
taken care of shortly after they entered the building, all of 
the other problems complained of were created or caused by 
Intermountain Marketing (R. 481). Mervin and Ethna Reid did not 
cause or authorize any of the problems complained of by defen-
dants through Mr. Diaz (R. 486, 558, 557). 
By his own admission, Mr. Diaz's major concern was the 
noise emanating from Intermountain Marketing (R. 555). Mr. Diaz 
asserts that after June 9, 1981 he had his secretary note each 
occurrence of noise from the adjacent tenants, Intermountain 
Marketing (R. 560, 561). Mr. Diaz is aware of only 19 separate 
occurrences, several of which were on the same date, during the 
8 month period from June 1981 through February 15, 1982 (Re-
sponses to Interrogatories, R. 133-138 and Supplement Responses 
210, R. 561). Mr. Diaz tape recorded these occurrences from 
Mutual of Omahafs office. Defendant selected excerpts from 
these tape recordings which were played to the court (R. 540, 
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541) and Mr. Diaz testified that these tape recordings were 
representative of the noise that came from Intermountain Market-
ing (R. 539, 571). 
However, other employees of defendants testified that 
Mr. Diaz's concern over the noise was exaggerated (R. 717, 718). 
The complained of noise consisted of applause, and laughter, as 
well as a countdown from 10 to 0 followed by "I feel great11 
repeated twice, followed by applause (R. 604,605). The count-
down lasted approximately 12 seconds in duration and was re-
ferred to as a "fire-up" drill (R. 604, 605). 
With regard to the alleged parking problems, Mr. Diaz 
admits that he was always able to find parking in the morning 
(R. 520). Also, there were always parking spaces available 
under the building (R. 489). 
With regard to the alleged janitorial problems, no 
problems existed after talking with the Reids (R, 554, 555). 
Intermountain Marketing, who used the same restrooms and common 
areas, had no complaints concerning janitorial services (R. 
621). 
With regard to the alleged problems in hallways as well 
as all other problems, these concerns were all resolved by the 
Reids through talking with the tenants (R. 770-776). 
Mr. Diaz cannot site any business that was lost because 
of the noise or the complained of problems by Intermountain 
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Marketing or by plaintiffs, Mervin and Ethna Reid (R. 583). 
Moreover, Mr. Diaz admits that each year Mutual of Omaha was in 
the Reid Building, they increased their production from the 
previous year (R. 660-665). 
Mr. Diaz told Mervin Reid that he needed more office 
space and asked him if Mutual of Omaha could rent more space (R. 
386, 387). The new lease procured by Mutual of Omaha provides 
for approximately 20% more space than they had in the Reid 
Building (Exhibit 32P). 
On November 17, 1981 plaintiffs received a letter from 
Mutual of Omaha's attorney, Larry Morton, stating that the noise 
must cease or that they would terminate the lease (Exhibits 
23d). In response, the Reids replied with a letter of December 
4, 1981 that they would hold Mutual of Omaha strictly to the 
terms of the lease obligations and would not allow the lease to 
be terminated (Exhibits 33P). At the end of December, defen-
dants had not heard any further noise from Intermountain Market-
ing and accordingly Mutual of Omaha instructed that January's 
rent should be paid (Exhibit 25D, R. 695-697). Mervin and Ethna 
Reid, likewise, heard no disturbances nor were they contacted by 
Mr. Diaz regarding any other problems with noise or any other 
complaints (R. 775, 776). From January 1, 1982, Mervin and 
Ethna Reid received no further complaints from either Mutual of 
Omaha or Mr. Diaz regarding any problem until February 14, 1982 
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wl2hen the moving van appeared at the Reid Building and Mr. Diaz 
indicated that he was leaving the leased premises (R. 487, 776). 
The Reids received a letter the following day, February 15th, 
indicating that Mutual of Omaha considered the lease agreement 
terminated (Exhibit 2P) . 
Mervin and Ethna Reid then filed suit against Mutual of 
Omaha for breach of the lease agreement and the verified com-
plaint was signed on April 8, 1982. 
On April 9, 1982 Intermountain Associated Marketing 
requested a lease for a substantial portion (Exhibit 31P) of the 
space previously occupied by Mutual of Omaha. On June 30, 1982 
Intermountain Marketing agreed to lease the remaining portion of 
the premises taken up by Mutual of Omaha (Exhibit 30P). In 
November, 1982 Intermountain Marketing vacated the premises and 
declared bankruptcy (R. 614). 
The suit for the breach of the lease agreement was tried 
before the Honorable Peter F. Leary on July 18, 19 and 20, 1983 
and the Court found after hearing all the evidence and listening 
to the tapes of the noise that all of the complained of problems 
of Mutual of Omaha were without merit and did not amount to a 
constructive eviction (R. 354, 355). The Court awarded plain-
tiffs damages for breach of lease agreement in the amount of 
$26,884.23 plus Judgment for the remaining payments due under 
the lease. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHERE THE TRIAL COURT DETERMINED THAT TENANT MUTUAL 
OF OMAHA'S ALLEGED PROBLEMS ARE WITHOUT MERIT, THE 
COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF A 
CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION. 
A. This Court should not overturn the trial court's 
finding that no constructive eviction occurred where 
the court's findings were based on reasonable and 
substantial evidence. 
The case of Brugger v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647 (Utah 1982) 
is directly on point and provides the applicable law for the 
case at bar. In that case the Court held that tenants were not 
constructively evicted from premises leased for the purpose of 
running a restaurant. Defendants claimed that the noise 
emanating from a disco below the restaurant as well as lack of 
maintenance and other associated problems which caused the 
restaurant to shut down one weekend were grounds for construc-
tive eviction. In that case, defendants entered a ten year 
lease with plaintiffs for the second floor of plaintifffs 
building. Some four months after defendants moved into the 
building, a disco was allowed to move into the building directly 
below defendants. Defendants complained to the owners that the 
loud disco music interfered with their business as well as 
attracting undesirable people. Defendants also complained a 
sewer problems and of leaks in roofs or holes in walls. The fan 
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i 
in the kitchen also broke requiring the restaurant to be closed 
over the weekend. The defendants then quit the premises, 
claiming they had been constructively evicted from the premises 
as a result of the disco noise, the lack of maintenance and the 
associated problems. 
The case was tried to a judge sitting without jury and 
the court held no constructive eviction occurred. This Court 
confirmed the judgment of the trial court and held that where 
competent evidence exists that the landlord or person under his 
control did not render premises or part thereof unsuitable for 
its intended purpose, a constructive eviction does not exist. 
This Court also explained that the evidence must be viewed in 
the light most favorable to the finding of a trier of fact. 
In the Brugger case, the main concern of the tenant 
claiming a constructive eviction was the noise, the disco in the 
basement, emanating from an adjacent tenant. Id., at 648. 
Likewise, Mutual of Omaha's primary concern was the noise 
emanating from Intermountain Marketing (R. 487). In the Brugger 
case, the Court found that disco was a disturbance but the noise 
had a limited effect on defendants' operation. Under the facts 
of this case, the Court found the noise made by Intermountain 
Marketing was distracting, but stated specifically that it was 
not of sufficient magnitude to warrant abandonment of the leased 
premises (R. 279) or otherwise make the premises unsuitable for 
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the purpose for which they were leased (Finding of Fact No. 5, 
R. 354). The Court further found in the case at bar that no 
evidence was presented that as a result of the noise or other 
alleged culative act, plaintiffs caused defendants any loss of 
business or damages (R. 279-80, Findings of Fact 7 and 8, R. 
355). 
In the Brugger case defendants complained of, in addi-
tion to noise, children being in the halls and maintenance 
problems which were significant enough to require the business 
to have been shut down over a weekend. Likewise, Mutual of 
Omaha complained of people in the halls and maintenance problems. 
Moreover, in Brugger, the defendants remained in pos-
session of the premises for 8 months after complaining of the 
noise and physical problems. In the case at bar, Mutual of 
Omaha complained of problems with the office building almost 
daily from the day they moved in (R. 441). These complaints 
were confirmed on June 10, 1981 by letter of Mr. Diaz indicating 
specific problems with the noise (R. 530). Like the complained 
of problems in Brugger, Mutual of Omaha waited a lengthy period, 
in this case fifteen months, before breaching its lease. 
In Brugger v. Fonoti, this court was asked to overturn 
the findings of the trial judge. This court specifically held 
that the Court would review the evidence in light most favorable 
to plaintiffs that unless the evidence was so clear and 
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I 
persuasive that all reasonable minds would necessarily conclude 
otherwise that it would uphold the trial court's findings. The 
Court stated: 
It is a well established rule that the Court will review 
the evidence and all inferences to be drawn therefrom 
most favorable to the findings of the triers of fact. 
Smith v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 344, 400 P.2d 570 (1965). { 
Id. at 648. 
In the case at bar defendants are requesting precisely 
what the appellant sought in the Brugger case, that is to 
overturn the trial judge's findings of fact that a constructive 
eviction did not exist. In this instance, the trial court's 
findings are well documented. Mutual of Omaha asserts that the 
real problem is the problem with the noise. (R. 555) • Mutual 
of Omaha admits that they can attest to only 19 occurrences of 
noise since June 1981 (R. 133-138, 210, 561). These occurrences
 { 
lasted approximately 12 seconds (R. 604, 605). Moreover, the 
Reids took precautions to prevent any problems from occurring 
(R. 445, 451,455, 456, 461-466, 763, 770-776). Mutual of Omaha
 ( 
indicated that the noise had indeed ceased as of the end of 
December, 1982 (Exhibit 25D, R. 695-697). 
Likewise the other problems, parking problems, problems 
with people in the hall, and maintenance problems had all 
resolved themselves after the attempts by Reids to solve the 
problems (R. 770-776). Plaintiff by his own admission, admits 
that the janitorial problems were remedied (R. 554, 555). 
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Intermountain Marketing indicates that the halls were cleared, 
and those problems associated with blocking the halls were 
alleviated (R. 770-776). Under these facts, the trial judge 
clearly had evidence upon which he could make a decision. These 
facts taken in light most favorable to plaintiffs as required by 
law, require that the holding of the trial court should be 
upheld. See Also, Smith v. Gallegos, 16 Utah 2d 344, 400 P.2d 
570 (1965); Thirteenth and Washington STS Corp. v. Neslen, 123 
Utah 70, 254 P.2d 847 (1953). 
B. Normal problems encountered in buildings which are 
remedied within a reasonable time do not amount to a 
constructive eviction. 
Mutual of Omaha's complaints as outlined above are 
merely ordinary complaints which may be encountered in any 
building. Where these complaints are acted upon and remedied by 
the landlord within a reasonable period of time, they do not 
amount to a constructive eviction. This court stated in Brugger 
v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647 (1982): 
. . . where the maintenance problems were remedied 
within a reasonable time, constructive eviction does not 
occur . . . Defendants1 basic complaints were that the 
toilet overflowed a couple of times, the roof leaked, 
and an exhaust fan failed when they were closed for a 
few days. These appear to be nothing other than the 
normal problems encountered with most any building, and 
were each taken care of as soon as reasonably possible. 
Id. at 648 (emphasis in original) 
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< 
In the case at bar the alleged problems are normal 
problems encountered in most any building and were remedied 
< 
within a reasonable time. Accordingly, a constructive eviction 
did not exist, 
C. Where tenant Mutual of Omaha did not abandon the 
premises within a reasonable amount of time 
constructive eviction did not occur. 
In Brugger v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647 (Utah 1982) citing 
Thirteen and Washington STS Corp. v. Neslen, 123 Utah 70, 254 
P.2d 847 (1953), the Court found that where defendants did not 
leave the premises after complaining of problems until after 8 
months, the constructive eviction did not exist. The court 
stated: 
Tenant must, however, abandon the premises within a 
reasonable time after the alleged interference. _Id. at 
648. 
In the case at bar, Mutual of Omaha began to claim problems 
almost immediately upon entering the building. However, it 
remained in the building for 16 months. Even after providing 
the Reids a formal notice of complaint of the noise in June of 
1980, it still remained in the building 8 months before vacating 
the premises. This is analogous to the facts situation in 
Brugger which the court found to be an unreasonable amount of 
time. Accordingly, this Court should uphold the trial court's 
decision which found that a constructive eviction did not occur. 
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D. Where plaintiffs, Mervin and Ethna Reid, did not 
interfere with tenant, Mutual of Omaha, and where the 
complained of acts do not render the premises unsuitable 
to conduct business, a constructive eviction has not 
occurred. 
The court in Brugger stated specifically that in order 
for a constructive eviction to occur, the landlord or someone 
under his control must interfere with the enjoyment of the 
leased premises and render those premises unsuitable for the 
purpose for which they are intended. The Court specifically 
enunciated the standard required for constructive eviction: 
Construction eviction occurs where tenant's rights of 
possession and enjoyment of the leased premises is 
interfered with by the landlord, or person under his 
control, as to render the premises, or a part thereof, 
unsuitable for the purposes intended. 14. at 648. 
In the case at bar, there is no indication that the 
premises were rendered unsuitable for the purpose intended. 
Mutual of Omaha at all times was able to conduct its selling of 
insurance. In fact, there is no proof of any loss of business 
(R. 583). Furthermore, production increased each year over the 
previous year while Mutual of Omaha was in the Reid Building (R. 
660-665). There is no testimony that the building was not 
suitable as office space, the purpose for which it was intended. 
The fact that Mutual of Omaha may have had specific 
standards for which they required their office space, does not 
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render the building unsuitable for the purpose for which it is 
intended. No specific standard is required by the lease agree-
ment. The standard for determining whether constructive evic-
tion exists as outlined in Brugger v. Fonoti, and Thirteenth and 
Washington STS Corp. v. Neslen is an objective test. The 
premises must be rendered unsuitable for the intended purpose by 
a reasonable person. Other courts have likewise imposed a 
"reasonable person11 objective standard. In Gottdiener v. 
Mailhot, 431 A.2d 851 (N.J. Super. 1981), a case dealing with a 
constructive eviction of a residential tenant, the court stated: 
The test is objective, the noise or disruptive conduct 
"must be such as truly to render the premises uninhabit-
able in the eyes of a reasonable person." Id., at 854. 
In the case at bar, the trier of fact determined that a 
reasonable person would not find that the premises were unsuit-
able for the purpose intended (Finding of Fact No. 5, R. 354), 
Mutual of Omaha's standard is therefore irrelevant. The weight 
of the evidence indicates that the Reid Building was suitable as 
office space. 
Furthermore, the main concern of Mutual of Omaha was the 
noise emanating from Intermountain Marketing (R. 555). In this 
instance, the noise was not created by the landlord nor did the 
landlord's have control over the activities of the adjacent 
tenant, Intermountain Marketing (R. 481). If the noise and 
alleged problems are created by Intermountain Marketing, then 
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Brugger case. The standard ; .L "ame. There mus: b<- iction 
t .. »„u-
i :ti ., • i remises unfit h i ehe nurpost- or which . : w. - intended. 
^ Ibi: ceenth and .Cush.rigion STS Corp _. case is uistin-
guisha b * J ^  case at L •- T ^'nl1 case the entrance to 
the building was obstructed by fi xtiires placed in the building 
by the • > bar ber she p • ax l i si ic: • a ilh f ne stai l :i w ere 
establishes , . ><s entrance and lobby. Visitors :.N- rffice Digitized by the Howard W. Hu ter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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were required to go through the barber shop and shoe shine stand 
in order to get to the elevator. The stairway was also blocked 
off. 
Furthermore, in that case, the defendants also experi-
enced difficulty with the hours the building remained open. The 
doors were locked at 8:00 p.m. each evening and on holidays 
while the lease provisions provided for the building to be open 
until 12:00 p.m. No elevator service was provided after 8:00 
p.m. and tenants were required to use a stairway which was not 
lit and which was used as a ,!latrine.11 Moreover, there was a 
lack of heat in the building and improper ventilation and 
continually foul smelling soap, towels and other essentials for 
the barber shop made the premises unacceptable as an office 
building. Under these conditions the trial judge determined 
that a constructive evictions existed. However, the factual 
allegations of Thirteenth and Washington STS Corp. case and the 
case at bar are readily distinguishable. In that case the court 
found the tenants1 complaints were substantial and taken in 
total, prevented tenant from using the building for the purpose 
for which it was rented. In this instance, the trial court 
properly held that all of the alleged complaints of Mutual of 
Omaha were without merit and did not render the premises unsuit-
able for the purpose for which it was intended. 
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POINT II 
WHERE THE TRIAL COURT HAS A REASONABLE OR SUB-
STANTIAL BASIS IN EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS FINDINGS, 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVERSE AND COMPEL A CON-
TRARY FINDING. 
A. The trial court's refusal to make certain findings 
of fact is based on a reasonable or substantial basis in 
evidence. 
Mutual of Omaha argues that the trial court failed to 
make specific findings on pertinent issues before the Court. 
The standard where the trier of fact has refused to make a 
finding is outlined in the case of Erickson v. Bennion, 28 Utah 
2d 371, 503 P.2d 139 (1972). In that case, plaintiff sought to 
recover damages caused to their home by irrigation water. 
Defendant made a motion to dismiss and the court made findings 
and entered judgment. Appellants sought to have the judgment 
overturned because the court did not make a finding of fact as 
to the negligence. The court held that in order for appellant 
to prevail, there must be a finding of fact to negligence and 
determined that under the facts of the case a reasonable man 
could have concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove 
negligence. The court stated specifically that no finding of 
fact need be made unless the evidence is so clear that all 
reasonable minds would conclude in favor of the finding of fact. 
...where the fact trier has not been convinced, and has 
refused to make a finding essential to the appellant's 
cause, this Court x^ ill not reverse and compel such a 
finding unless the evidence is so clear and pervasive Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that all reasonable minds would necessarily so conclude. 
Id. at 141. 
In the case at bar, Mutual of Omaha attempts to allege j 
certain complaints which it claims constitute constructive 
eviction. Mutual of Omaha contends that direct evidence rebut-
ting the statements of defendants was not presented. However, 
direct rebuttal evidence was not necessary for the court to make 
its finding as defendants1 own statements minimizing the alleged 
problems or statements by other individuals disclaiming the 
alleged problems or declaring the problems had been solved were 
sufficient to controvert the evidence and testimony of defen-
dants. Under these circumstances, based on a reasonable or 
substantial basis in evidence, the court properly omitted any 
finding of fact dealing with a constructive eviction. 
Defendants assert that failure to make findings on all 
material issues constitutes reversal error and cites three Utah 
cases. A careful reading of these cases, Remel v. ZionTs First 
National Bank, N.A., 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980); Boyer Company v. 
Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977); Gaddis Investment Company v. 
Morrison, 30 Utah 2d 43, 278 P.2d 284 (1954) indicates that none 
of these cases were reversed. The court in each instance 
remanded to the trial court for further findings. Accordingly, 
even if findings were not made all that is mandated is a remand 
for further findings. A reversal would be improper under the 
circumstances. 
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B. A mixture of conclusionary findings mixed with 
findings of ultimate facts, does not create reversible 
error. 
The applicable law in this instance is stated by The New 
Mexico Supreme Court in the case of In the Matter of the Estate 
of Hilton, 98 N.M. 420, 649 P.2d 488 (1982), involving the 
contesting of a will. The court stated specifically that the 
mixing of conclusionary facts and ultimate facts would not 
create reversal error. 
Ultimate facts and conclusions of law are often indis-
tinguishable, and their intermixture in the court's 
decision as written does not create reversal error where 
fair construction then justifies the court's judgment. 
Id. at 491. 
Even if there were a mixture of ultimate facts and 
conclusiary law, in this instance these findings justify the 
court's judgment and would not amount to reversal error. 
POINT III 
ELECTION OF REMEDIES IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE 
CASE AT BAR. 
Initially, respondents have no argument with appellants' 
characterization of election of remedies other than the fact 
that it is not applicable in the case at bar. Mutual of Omaha 
correctly points out that the doctrine of election of remedies 
applies to bar two actions which are inconsistent, generally 
based on incompatible facts. In the case at bar, the Reids did 
not pursue two inconsistent remedies. The remedies which the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Reids pursued were clear from the outset of the dispute between 
the parties. In their letter of December 4, 1981 the Reids 
clearly indicated that Mutual of Omaha would be held liable for 
the entire rent obligation as well as attorney's fees in that it 
would seek strict compliance with the obligations required in 
the lease (Ex. 33P). The Reids then filed their complaint which 
clearly expressed the causes of action for damages resulting 
from breach of the lease agreement, including past due rents as 
well as future rents (R. 2-8). The Amended Complaint likewise 
addressed the exact same issues and exact same causes of action 
(R. 107-126). Defendants were at all times aware that the lease 
agreement was in effect and that plaintiffs sought to hold 
defendants for the entire rental balance due under the terms of 
the lease provision. 
Under the terms of the lease provision, an election to 
terminate the lease need not be made and plaintiffs may pursue 
damages under the terms of the lease. The lease provision 
specifically states that plaintiffs may recover from defendants 
the amount by which the rent reserved exceeds the amount paid as 
rent by reletting (Ex. 1, Lease Agreement para. 19). The 
paragraph further provides that in the event the landlord does 
not collect rent from the new tenant, such deficiency shall be 
calculated and paid monthly by tenant (Ex. 1, Lease Agreement 
para. 19). 
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Under these circumstances, it is clear that the court is 
not dealing with inconsistent or incompatible facts as described 
in Farmers and Merchant Bank v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. , 4 
Utah 2d 155, 289 P.2d 1045 (1955). The remedies sought by 
plaintiffs-respondents are for damages for breach of the lease 
obligation as defined by paragraph 18 of the lease betx^ een the 
parties. Plaintiffs-respondents have neither expressly, nor by 
their actions, sought to terminate the lease agreement. 
Furthermore, the court has determined that the remedy 
which the Reids pursued was clear from the pleadings and the 
record. No termination existed either expressly or impliedly 
(Conclusions of Law, R. 360) and no such evidence of a termina-
tion was presented (R. 279). The court also implied, by denying 
Mutual of Omaha's motion for election of remedies, that an 
election of remedies was not appropriate or mandated in this 
action (R. 279). Moreover, defendants do not suggest that they 
have been prejudiced by the Court failing to rule on their 
motion. Defendants1 evidence would have been no different had 
the court required an election from the outset. The question of 
constructive eviction was independent from the question of 
damages and Mutual of Omaha was allowed to present all of its 
evidence. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED DAMAGES TO PLAIN-
TIFFS, MERVIN AND ETHNA REID, AND AGAINST MUTUAL OF 
OMAHA PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A. Mervin and Ethna Reids1 actions in mitigating 
damages after the abandonment of tenant Mutual of 
Omaha was proper under the terms of the lease 
agreement and principles of common law and did 
not constitute an acceptance of the abandonment. 
The appropriate law to be applied in this instance is 
best enunciated in the case of Noce v. Stemen, 77 N.M. 71, 419 
P.2d 450 (1966). The court dealt with an action by landlord to 
recover rents due under a written lease and for damages to the 
leased premises. Tenants claimed that the lease had been 
terminated by operation of law when plaintiffs entered the 
leased premises and attempted to procure a new tenant. The 
court held that when a tenant abandons the premises, landlord 
may rent the leased premises and the tenant would remain liable 
for any rents due for the unexpired term. The court in that 
case stated specifically that: 
"but even had the appellees attempted to procure a new 
tenant, this act would not necessarily constitute an 
acceptance of appellants1 surrender, depending upon the 
lessor's intent, either express or implied . . ." In 
Hughes v. Porterfield, . . . it was recognized that a 
landlord may rent the leased premises on behalf of the 
tenant, the tenant remains liable for any rents due for 
the unexpired term. See also, McAdam, Landlord and 
Tenant, (5th Edition) 1 322; Tiffany, Real Property, 
supra; and 3A Thompson Real Property, supra Id. at 451. 
In the case at bar, plaintiffs1, Mervin and Ethna Reid, 
clear intent was to hold Mutual of Omaha liable for the entire 
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rents due under the lease. Mervin and Ethna Reid cited in their 
letter to Mutual of Omaha that they intended to hold Mutual of 
Omaha to the entire lease payments (Ex. 33P). Immediately after 
the abandonment, Mervin and Ethna Reid filed suit seeking the 
unpaid rents for the unexpired term. 
Moreover, plaintiffs, Mervin and Ethna Reid, were merely 
seeking to enforce their remedies as provided for under the 
lease which provides that plaintiffs may re-enter the property, 
release the premises and hold defendants liable for the entire 
rental amount due and owing (Lease Agreement 1f 19, Ex. 1). 
Mutual of Omaha, at all times knew that no termination 
had occurred. Even up to the date of trial, Mutual of Omaha, 
requested that plaintiffs elect whether it planned to terminate 
the lease (R. 398,399). The lease agreement specifically 
provided that should lessors, Mervin and Ethna Reid, attempt to 
terminate the lease, notice was required to be given by the 
lessor (Lease Agreement 1f 19, Ex. 1). In this case, no notice 
was ever provided (R. 279). 
Not only did the act of re-entry and an attempt to lease 
the premises not constitute termination, but re-entry and 
remodeling were expressly provided for in the lease agreement 
(Lease Agreement 1f 19, Ex. 1). The lease provision specifically 
provided that remodeling and reletting would not constitute a 
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i 
termination but were allowed for under the terms of the lease 
(Lease Agreement «,[ 19, Ex, 1). 
Under these circumstances, the trial court properly held 
that no termination occurred (R. 360), 
Mervin and Ethna Reid at the time of the abandonment of 
the premises were in a precarious position. They were subject 
to a common law duty to mitigate even where the rental or lease 
agreement specifically states no mitigation of damages is 
required in the event of a breach, Ross v. Smigelski, 166 N.W.2d 
243 (Wis, 1969). Under these circumstances plaintiffs, in order 
to attempt to mitigate damages was under a duty to relet. It 
would be extremely inequitable and unjust under the circum-
stances to now penalize plaintiffs for attempting to mitigate 
damages by declaring a termination. The better ruling is that 
of the trial court that no termination occurred since plaintiffs 
were merely following the procedure as outlined in the lease and 
clearly enunciated their intent to bind Mutual of Omaha to the 
entire unexpired rent. 
Defendant Mutual of Omaha cites certain cases in which 
it attempts to establish the position that an abandonment re-
leases the lessee from the duty to pay rent. Although, tenants 
are relieved from liability to pay rent where they abandon the 
premises and landlord accepts the abandonment, this is not the 
case where the abandonment is not accepted by the landlord. 
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Otherwise, no lease would be of any validity since all tenant 
would have to do is abandon the property to rid itself of any 
lease obligations. The proper point of law is stated in the 
case of Roosen v. Schaffer, 127 Ariz. 346, 621 P.2d 33 (Ariz. 
App. 1980) where the court addressed the problem of abandonment 
of the tenant and reletting by the landlord. In that case 
lessor brought suit against lessee seeking unpaid rents accrued 
prior to his reletting of the premises and the balance of rent 
owing under the first lease. Defendant attempted to defend by 
stating that a surrender absolved him from any liability of 
paying rent. The court in that case properly held that lessor 
who refuses to accept surrender of the lease may recover the 
unpaid rent due prior to reletting the premises and future rents 
due under the balance of the lease subject to duty to mitigate 
damages by making reasonable effort to relet the premises. 
In the case at bar, plaintiffs, Mervin and Ethna Reid, 
had no choice but to mitigate damages. Where plaintiffs clearly 
followed the lease provisions and notified Mutual of Omaha of 
their intent to hold them to all future rents, plaintiffs, 
Mervin and Ethna Reidsf, actions should not be construed as an 
abandonment. 
B. In Utah the question of whether or not there has 
been an abandonment of a lease and an acceptance is a 
question of fact. 
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The appropriate law is cited in John C. Cutler Associ-
ation v. De Jay Stores, 3 Ut.2d 107, 279 P.2d 700 (1955), where 
-I 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The question of surrender, being generally one of fact 
as to what was the intention of the parties, needs to be 
determined from all of the attendant circumstances, 
including the conduct and expression of the party. The < 
defendant De Jay having prevailed, is entitled to have 
us view the evidence and every fair instance and intend-
ment arising therefrom in the light most favorable to 
it. And if, when so regarded, there is any substantial 
evidence, or as sometimes stated, any reasonable basis 
in the evidence, to support the finding made by the { 
trial court, it will not be disturbed. E^d. at 703. 
In the case at bar there is clearly reasonable basis in 
evidence to support the finding. Plaintiffs wrote letters to 
defendants, the lease agreement provides for the remedy plain-
tiffs exercised without a finding of abandonment and plaintiffs 
filed lawsuit immediately after the abandonment asking for the 
damages it sought (See Novack v. Fontaine Furniture Company, 146 
A. 2d 525, 536 (N.H. 1929) holding that the filing of a lawsuit 
for breach of lease serves as notice of intention to hold the 
lessee to the terms of the lease.) Under these circumstances, 
reasonable evidence suggests that plaintiffs did not surrender 
or abandon the property.
 I 
C. The trial court properly awarded damages of rental 
due under the balance of the lease. 
In Roosen v. Schaffer, 127 Ariz. 346, 621 P. 2d 33 
(Ariz. App. 1980), lessor brought suit against lessee for breach 
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of the lease agreement seeking unpaid rent accrued prior to the 
reletting of the premises and the balance of rent owing under 
the lease. In that case, the lease provision provided specif-
ically that lessor would have the right to remedies of accepting 
both rents past due and future rents. In that case plaintiff 
was allowed by the lease provision to recover for rents past 
due. However, recovery of unpaid future rent had not been 
specified under the lease as an available remedy. The court 
held because the lease provision provided for remedies in 
addition to those provided by law, the plaintiff was entitled to 
both the common law remedy of future rents as well as remedy 
provided for past due rents under the lease. Accordingly, 
plaintiff was awarded both past due rents and future rents. 
The court stated specifically that: 
the lessor may recover the unpaid rent to prior to 
reletting the premises and the future rent due under the 
balance of the lease, subject to the duty to mitigate 
the damages by reletting the premises. ]A. at 36. 
In the case at bar, the lease agreement provides for the 
specific measure of damages. The lease agreement provides for 
damages of the costs of reletting plus the rent due under the 
lease provision minus any amounts received in rent from relet-
ting. Like the Roosen case, Mervin and Ethna Reid are seeking a 
remedy for damages as provided for under the lease agreement and 
which is consistent with common law. In this instance only the 
_ 0 7 _ 
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' • . ' i 
remedy they seek will provide them with the benefit of their 
bargain in entering into the lease with Mutual of Omaha. 
I 
The facts indicate that plaintiffs, Mervin and Ethna 
Reid, expended over $10,000.00 in providing excellent, first-
rate office space for Mutual of Omaha. In order to recoup their 
expenses, the Reids are entitled to collect rentals for the 
entire 5-year lease period. Only by being insured of their 
rental would Mervin and Ethna Reid receive the benefit of their 
bargain. By allowing them their past due rents, future rents, 
plus costs of reletting minus any sums received by new tenants, 
Mervin and Ethna Reid are merely being insured the benefit of 
their bargain during the lease period, i.e., a guaranty of the 
amount they would have received had Mutual of Omaha stayed in 
the building the full five years. Anything less would deprive 
them of the benefit of their bargain. 
Should Mervin and Ethna Reid be relegated to accept only 
rents from the time of Judgment, they would be required to 
accept the risk of the poor rental market. If they were not 
given the costs of reletting, they would receive less than what 
they would have received had Mutual of Omaha stayed in the 
premises. The Reids should be entitled to the exact benefit 
they would have had had Mutual of Omaha not left the premises. 
The Reids are merely seeking to enforce the terms of the lease 
agreement. 
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Defendant-appellant wrongly asserts that plaintiffs are 
seeking future damages. They are merely seeking the remedy 
provided for under the lease agreement, that is, the amount the 
rent reserved for the period of reletting exceeds the amount 
paid by the new tenant on a monthly basis. Paragraph 19 of the 
lease states: 
11
 [LJandlord may take possession pursuant to this lease 
and relet said premises or any part thereof for term or 
terms (which may be for a term extended beyond the terms 
of this lease) and if such rental or rentals and upon 
such other terms and conditions as landlord in the 
exercise of landlord's sole discretion may deem advis-
able with the right to make alterations and repairs to 
said premises. Upon each such reletting, tenant shall 
be immediately liable for and shall pay to landlord, in 
addition to any indebtedness due hereunder, the costs 
and expenses of such reletting due hereunder, the costs 
and expenses of such reletting including advertising 
costs, brokerage fees, and reasonable attorney's fees 
incurred and the cost of such alteration and repairs 
incurred by landlord and the amount, if any, which the 
rent reserved in this lease for the period of such 
reletting (up to but not beyond the term of this lease) 
exceeds the amount agreed to be paid as rent for the 
premises for said period by such reletting. If tenant 
has been credited with any rents to be received by such 
reletting and such rents shall not be promptly paid to 
landlord by the new tenant, such deficiencies shall be 
calculated and paid monthly by tenant. Ho such re-entry 
or taking possession of the premises by landlord shall 
be construed as an election by the landlord to terminate 
this lease unless the termination thereof by decree by a 
court of competent jurisdiction or stated specifically 
by the landlord in writing addressed to tenants.!f 
(Lease Agreement U19, Ex. 1). 
Under the provisions of the lease agreement, Plaintiffs 
are not entitled to all future rents in one lump sum. Rather, 
plaintiffs are entitled to a month to month guaranty that they 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
{ 
will receive the rental due under the lease agreement. Thus, 
the trial court properly awarded plaintiffs an award of a 
i 
monthly rental amount minus any amounts they are able to collect 
in mitigation. 
Only in this way may plaintiffs, Mervin and Ethna Reid, 
receive the benefit of their bargain. Defendants contest 
that the proper measure of damages is the difference between the 
value of the rent reserved and the present fair market value of 
the remainder, and that the two are presumed to be the same. 
However, in the case at bar, plaintiffs presented evidence that 
they were not able to obtain a tenant for over 8 months, that 
they had not obtained a tenant at the time of the trial and that 
the market was experiencing difficulty in the area where 
plaintiff's building exists (R. 357, 358). Under these 
circumstances the presumption has been rebutted and the fair 
rental value cannot be determined to be the market value. 
Moreover, in this instance, the damages were agreed upon 
by the parties as outlined in the lease agreement. Accordingly, 
these provisions should take precedence and damages should be 
determined by the lease agreement. CD. Stimson Co. v. Porter, 
195 F.2d 410, 413 (10th Cir. 1952). 
D. Future rents are a proper measure of damages. 
In Penelko, Inc. v. John Price Associates, plaintiff 
sought damages for profits lost due to tenant's breach of a 
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lease agreement. That case held that the award of future damage 
involving a breach of lease was appropriate. The court stated 
specifically: 
The crucial question awarding future damages involving a 
breach of the lease which affects the long-term value of 
the lease or the lessee's profit making potential is 
whether such damages can be ascertained with reasonable 
certainty. Li. at 1235. 
In the case at bar, the lease provides specifically with 
reasonable certainty the damages to which plaintiffs are entitled. 
The so called "future damages11 are simply the exact amount of 
the rental due minus any mitigation. This amount is as reason-
ably certain as is possible. Sixty-six thousand dollars was to 
be paid at a rate of $1,100.00 per month. Although defendants 
tried to characterize the damages as future damages, the trial 
court awarded only $1,100.00 per month minus any amount received 
in mitigation. This is exactly the remedy provided for in the 
lease agreement. No acceleration was provided for, only a month 
to month rental as they accrue. Therefore, the damages awarded 
by the court are not future damages. But even if they were, 
they are ascertainable with reasonable certainty and would be 
proper under the holding of the Penelko case. 
POINT V 
THE CASE AT BAR INVOLVES QUESTIONS OF LAW AND 
FACT INTERPRETING THE LEASE AGREEMENT AND DOES 
NOT REQUIRE COURT TO REVIEW QUESTIONS OF EQUITY. 
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Plaintiffs, Mervin and Ethna Reid, are merely asking the 
court to interpret the agreement and to make findings of fact 
pursuant to that agreement. There are no issues of equity that 
need to be determined in plaintiffs' case only issues of fact as 
to whether the lease agreement was indeed breached. 
Appellants contend that their counterclaim for 
constructive eviction is somehow a question of equity. This is 
clearly not the case. What amounts to a constructive eviction 
is a question of fact and accordingly a determination of equity 
is not required in this instance. 
What amounts to a constructive eviction is the question 
of fact. Gottdiener v. Mailhot, 431 A.2d 851 (N.J. 
Super. 1981). 
Accordingly, under the facts of the case at bar, the court is 
not required to determine the issues of equity. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court had an opportunity to review all the 
facts regarding Mutual of Omaha's alleged constructive eviction. 
The court even had an opportunity to listen to the noise which 
defendants recorded and which they claimed was the major concern 
of rendering the space inoperable. After hearing the rendition 
of the complained of noise, the court found that the complaints 
of defendants were without merit. All of the other complaints 
involved problems common to any business and all were resolved 
by the actions of plaintiffs, Mervin and Ethna Reid. Under the 
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circumstances the court is clearly justified in finding that no 
constructive eviction occurred. 
The trial court then addressed itself to the issue of 
damages. Finding that the parties agreed on specific damage 
provisions, the court determined that the only way which Mervin 
and Ethna Reid could receive the benefit of the bargain is to 
provide them with rentals due and to become due under the lease 
minus any money received through mitigation. Only in this way 
will Mervin and Ethna Reid receive the benefit of their bargain 
in light of the fact that they clearly did not intend to termi-
nate the lease agreement but rather affirmatively asserted that 
they would hold defendants to strict compliance under the terms 
of the lease including all rental obligations. 
Accordingly, the trial court's determination should be 
upheld and this matter should be remanded to the trial court for 
an award to plaintiffs of attorney1s fees provided for under the 
lease agreement. 
Respectfully submitted this fH^ day of May, 1984. 
McKAY, BURTON, THURMAN & CONDIE 
Reid Tateoka 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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